IPR protection, Special 301 Report - 2013 Annual Report out

For those interested in intellectual property protection issues around the world and the US view on enforcement of these rights the 2013 Special 301 Report was released yesterday. It is found here. I had blogged about the previous year's report here.

As usual I am not commenting on the details of the report but confining myself to the aspects of dispute settlement that were referred to here. The report stated:

"The United States continues to monitor the resolution of disputes announced in previous Special 301 reviews. The most efficient and preferred manner of resolving concerns is through bilateral dialogue. Where these efforts are unsuccessful, the United States will not hesitate to use the WTO dispute settlement procedures, as appropriate."

No surprises here in the use of dispute settlement at the WTO to pursue perceived national interest. I was curious to know if any reference to the the proposed measures by Antigua in relation to the US Gambling case (DS285) would be referred to in terms of cross retaliation in the intellectual property space. Reference to this, though not directly related to that dispute, made interesting reading:

"Also of concern is the distribution over the Internet of software that allows for the circumvention of technological protection measures used by rights holders to protect their content. A particularly troubling example is that of SlySoft, a company headquartered and operating in Antigua, which developed and sells a program called “Any DVD HD” enabling the user to defeat the encryption technology embedded in Blu-ray Discs that prevents unauthorized reproduction and distribution. Antigua’s Copyright Act makes it illegal to manufacture or import for sale or rental any such circumvention device. The consortium of electronic manufacturers, software companies, and motion picture studios that developed these technological protection measures has worked with the criminal enforcement authorities in Antigua for over 5 years to enforce this statute and have this case prosecuted. However this case has proceeded very slowly."

I was just trying to envision the implication of this technology for Antigua's next moves on the cross retaliation issue in the US Gambling case. No bets on this issue!

Antigua case - An illogical ruling?

I have blogged about the US Online Gambling case here.

Stewart and Stewart, while making a detailed analysis of the dispute here, argue that the measure of cross-retaliation in this case is an illogical step and could harm the WTO system.

"As explained above, this case presents a unique situation in which a WTO member has responded to an adverse WTO ruling by seeking to amend its WTO commitments to make clear that its obligations do not apply to the domestic policy which had been found problematic. To obtain this amendment, the U.S. was required to provide compensation to all affected WTO members, not only those who would have been entitled to retaliate if they had brought the original dispute. As noted above, the U.S. was able to reach agreements with each of the countries that requested compensation except for Antigua. If agreement had been reached with Antigua, or if arbitration under Article XXI of the GATS had settled the amount of compensation to be provided, the U.S. would now be in compliance with its amended WTO obligations even with its domestic gambling policies still in place, and Antigua (along with other countries) would be compensated for the withdrawn concession.

Instead, because WTO rules permit Antigua to withdraw benefits for the on-going violation under the DSU even as arbitration under the GATS remains suspended, the U.S. is now faced with the prospect of open-ended retaliation for on-going violations it is unable to address through a renegotiation of its commitments. In short, the U.S. may have to pay two times to resolve one problem – once to amend its obligations to reflect what it thought it had originally agreed to when it negotiated the GATS, and once as a result of retaliation authorized in the course of a dispute launched before that amendment was made."

The above submission raises the important point of domestic policy space to amend past commitments in the context of a dispute.This piece however seems to support Antigua. Interesting...

Antigua, the U.S and a rule based system of dispute settlement

The proceedings of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body in a recent meeting throws light on the Online Gambling case (DS 285). While WTO watchers are keenly awaiting Antigua's proposed moves in relation to the cross-retaliation in this case, the use of cross-retaliatory measure in the field of IP has evoked strong reactions.

Some excerpts from the meeting indicate the strong, divergent viewpoints held as well as possible outcomes:

"Dominica, speaking on behalf of Antigua and Barbuda, said that Antigua and Barbuda was disappointed at the lack of compliance by the US and its failure to identify a single measure designed to implement the DSB’s recommendations and rulings.  Furthermore, Antigua and Barbuda was concerned that, at the January 2013 DSB meeting, the US had used terms such as “theft of intellectual property” and “government-authorised piracy” in relation to the lawful and expressly authorised use of trade remedies provided for in the WTO agreements. 

In Antigua and Barbuda’s view, the use of such intemperate and dismissive language by the US was a fundamental challenge to the WTO and a reputational assault both on the DSB that had given the approval for intellectual property (IP) suspensions and on Antigua and Barbuda that had sought its right to exercise it.  Antigua and Barbuda called on members to defend the WTO’s fundamental principles and to ensure that its rulings are applied equally by all countries despite their size. 

...

The United States noted that Antigua and Barbuda had assured the DSB that it would notify and provide specific details about how it would implement the suspension of concessions and that Antigua and Barbuda would not encourage or allow itself to become a haven for IP piracy. With regard to the status of the dispute, the US did not agree with Antigua and Barbuda’s view that the US had been unwilling to negotiate in good faith.  The US had been following the established, multilateral WTO process for responding to the DSB’s findings and had, in 2007, begun the process of modifying its Schedule of Specific Commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).  The US had offered substantial compensatory adjustments in other service areas and every member had agreed to the compensation package except Antigua and Barbuda.  The US had also sought to offer Antigua and Barbuda elements other than new services concessions.  The US remained open and ready to engage with Antigua and Barbuda to find a solution."

What will the result be n this case:

1. A negotiated, amicable settement or a compensatory package?

2. Protracted dispute settlement proceedings on what constitutes compliance and claims of compliance and non-compliance?

3. A strong cross-retaliatory move by Antigua suspending rights of US IP holders?

4. Proceedings disputing the validity of the measures undertaken to cross-retaliate?

5. No action by Antigua and letting the dispute seeing no end?

Will it also be a case where the "rule-based" nature of the dispute settlement will be established? Or will it go the way that political economy of relations often force it to? The dispute in many ways is the test of the multilateral institutions rule based dispute settlement system - in terms of its efficacy, remedies and compliance.

Cross retaliation and dispute settlement

International economic law experts watch with keen anxiety the next steps Antigua would take to effectuate the cross-retaliation sanction it has received from the WTO in the  US- Online Gambling case at the WTO. 

This NYT opinion preferred a negotiated deal rather than the execution of cross-retaliation. Simon Lester suggests in this blogpost that Antigua should adopt a non-abusive, reasonable way of retaliation by putting works that have received excessive protection in the public domain. Scott Lincicome highlights the strong impact the threat of cross retaliation can have in the context of non-complied WTO disputes in this view.

While many conjecture on how Antigua would implement the cross-retaliation option (many also feel that it would ultimately lead to a negotiated settlement) Shamnad Basheer in this piece offers a tiered approach to cross retaliation essentially contending that cross-retaliation should be considered a mainstream retaliatory technique rather than a secondary one. Calling it the "Tiered IP suspension model" he proposes:

"Whilst the notion of IP “cross-retaliation” has been doing the rounds for a while, there is considerable uncertainty regarding how this concept will be operationalized and implemented. Developing countries urgently need to work out an optimal model that helps assess losses to the foreign IP owner in a reasonably objective way—this way there is no time lost between the procuring of a favorable order from the WTO sanctioning cross-retaliation and the actual cross- retaliation itself. The lack of a credible domestic model has no doubt caused Antigua’s threat of cross retaliation to be taken less seriously by the US. 

This paper seeks to fill this lacuna by proposing a tiered suspension mechanism as a viable option. That the model lacks technical precision in terms of computing losses to IP owners accurately is not fatal since the current WTO framework only requires a broadly objective model that does not reek of arbitrariness. Further, the aim of this paper is to evolve a model that will help in securing compliance or a settlement. Given that the IP lobbies in countries such as the US and the EU are powerful, the likelihood of a settlement or compliance is very strong. Particularly, since the model advocates an automatic compulsory license after the offending measures have been removed. In other words, the likelihood of a country having to operationalize the IP suspension model is very remote. Any infirmities in the model ought to be evaluated, bearing this over- arching assumption in the model. Further, the current WTO framework only requires that broad equivalence be achieved and not that the retaliating state compute the losses to suspended IP owners in a technically accurate manner."

While one would have to wait to see how Antigua takes it forward, it is clear that cross-retaliation has brought back into focus the issue of compliance under the dispute settlement process. Will it lead to enhanced compliance or more complex negotiated settlements?

Antigua, gambling and a dispute

The US-Gambling case (DS 285) more popularly known as the Antigua case makes for an interesting case study of a WTO dispute settlement case.Yet another Caribbean country taking on the US, very similar to the rum cases that I had blogged about here. While I am not going into the legal aspects of the GATS violations in this blog post (it basically related to the interpretation of commitments that the US had undertaken under the GATS), the case brings to the fore many aspects of the nature of the dispute settlement process itself. For a brief summary of the dispute see this synopsis here.The AB essentially held that US measures of totally prohibiting online betting and gambling services of Antigua were inconsistent with the obligations it had undertaken under GATS.

Some observations about the dispute:

1. Long standing dispute - The request for consultations by Antigua was made in 2003. It is 2013 and the dispute has not reached a final conclusion to the satisfaction of the complainant even after the AB had ruled in its favor in 2007. This raises the issue of the efficacy of the dispute settlement system to provide efficacious remedies in a time-bound manner.

2. Evidence of a rule-based system - The case has been heralded by some as evidence that both smaller and large trading countries have equal rights in the system. As mentioned by Antigua's lawyer here:

"With Antigua, it’s $21 million. Maybe with China it’s going to be U.S. $21 billion. One of the messages we want to get across is that the WTO was sold to smaller countries as a level playing field and a way for them to expand the reach of commerce, subject to a set of rules that apply to everybody. I think more than anything else, this case is about fairness. The WTO is supposed to be fair.”

This goes back to the point that the dispute settlement mechanism, which is considered as as the crown jewel of the the WTO system, is based on rules and not on power politics. Countries irrespective of their trading and geo-political strength can challenge larger, more powerful trading partners at the dispute settlement. However, the inability of Antigua to meaningfully implement the WTO decision raises questions about the fairness of the system. Of what use is a rule-based system if the complainant cannot implement a decision or bear the fruits of it. Is the threat of other sanctions or the reality of trade much more overbearing that a judicial decision?

3. Landmark GATS case - This case is also considered as one of the few (there are only 23 cases that cite the GATS Agreement out of the over 400 WTO cases) cases where the commitments under the GATS were scrutinized by the dispute settlement mechanism. With services trade gaining in importance, this percentage is definitely going to grow.

4. Cross-Retaliation - The WTO has authorized Antigua to retaliate against the U.S. due to the latter's failure to comply with the decision. Antigua has threatened to retaliate in another sector - intellectual property - by ignoring copyrights of US holders by selling material on a website.This is an interesting strategy of retaliating in a sector not a subject matter of the dispute (the case was about GATS commitments, but the retaliation is proposed under copyrights) but which is a very strongly guarded right in the US. Will this strategy be used by other countries in their disputes? What implications does the suspension of obligations under TRIPS have for the legal framework that protects these rights? Shamnad Basheer has this detailed study of how a cross-retaliation model can be used by developing countries to ensure compliance in WTO cases. The USTR seemed concerned at the prospect of a suspension of obligations under TRIPS:

"The United States is concerned, however, that the Arbitrator agreed with Antigua’s request to suspend WTO concessions not just with respect to services, but also with respect to intellectual property rights (IPR).  Any authorization pursuant to the award would be strictly limited to Antigua; every other WTO Member remains obliged to protect U.S. IPR under WTO rules, including enforcement against any IPR-infringing goods.  Moreover, even with respect to Antigua, it would establish a harmful precedent for a WTO Member to affirmatively authorize what would otherwise be considered acts of piracy, counterfeiting, or other forms of IPR infringement.  Furthermore, to do so would undermine Antigua’s claimed intentions of becoming a leader in legitimate electronic commerce, and would severely discourage foreign investment in the Antiguan economy."

The Gambling case is an interesting case reflecting the many challenges that the dispute settlement mechanism faces. It also brings us back to the question as to what constitutes "compliance" in a case, which the US claims to be undertaking. We faced that in the long drawn Airbus-Boeing subsidies case too.

Shamnad Basheer has a great blogpost on the dispute on SpicyIP here.

For a different take, see Eyes on Trade blogpost which believes that this is yet another example of trampling of US domestic policy space by the WTO (after Tuna safe dolphins, COOL decision and Clove Cigarettes case) and it also sees "tiny" countries used as pawns by business interests to take on the major markets.

"The delicious and tsunami-scale irony is that now Antigua (population 88,000 and GDP $1 billion) is being "borrowed" by gambling interests to cross-retaliate against the United States - by removing intellectual property rights from U.S. products in the first use of such a sanction. Except, wait, didn't Ralph Nader warn against just this scenario of some commercial interest finding a tiny country to attack U.S. public interest policies back when the WTO was being debated?"

Another classic case study for the international trade law books?