Ninth WTO Ministerial Conference - Will Bali be able to deliver?

MINISTERIAL CONFERENCES Ninth WTO Ministerial Conference

The WTO website has a new page for the 9th Ministerial Conference of the WTO to be held in December 2013. It also has a record of all the eight earlier Ministerials since WTO was established in 1995.

Hopefully, more information on what is shaping up at Bali will be found here in the coming months.

Over to Bali, Indonesia

The serene environs of Bali will host the next Ministerial Conference (MC9) of the WTO in December 2013. I had earlier blogged about this here. Will we see some headway in the Doha rounds of negotiations here? The WTO website announced the MC9 here. The ground rules were set:

"Also resulting from her consultations, the chair proposed the following principles "to guide both the preparations for MC9 and the Conference itself":

• First, the “FIT” principle — Full participation, Inclusiveness, and Transparency;

• Second, any issue for action or decision by Ministers proposed by members should be developed by them in line with the normal consensus principle; and

• Third, issues for action or decision by Ministers should be agreed well before MC9."

Will the salubrious setting of Bali break the Doha deadlock? Will it lead to a meaningful advancement of the Doha round? Will we see the single undertaking principle given up for "low hanging fruit" agreements? Will we see a turn around in negotiations at the multilateral level? If any decisions are to culminate in Bali, the next 10 months would involve extensive negotiations to reach that goal.

Over to Bali.

Doha round - A guide

Here is a primer on what the Doha round is all about from the The Guardian - like a common person's guide on Doha. I liked the last part that dealt with the what next?

" Will the Doha round ever end? 

Each round of multilateral trade talks over the last 70 years has taken longer than the one that preceded it, so the sluggish nature of the Doha round isn't unprecedented. But the round will reach, if not celebrate, its 11th birthday in November – and there's still no end in sight. "Those of you who believe that … the round might lose all its remaining steam may be right, whether we like it or not," the WTO director general, Pascal Lamy, warned negotiators in July 2012. "Credibility lies in the capacity to produce results, not statements."

I had blogged sometime back on the likelihood of completion of trade negotiations here. With 157 members on the negotiating table, the next Director General of the WTO may perhaps have his or her task cut out. 

A Global Recovery Round for trade negotiations required?

A lot has been written about the Doha impasse and the way forward. How does one move forward? What are the dangers for multilateral trade if the negotiations impasse continues?

The Economist had this to offer in a recent piece titled "Goodbye Doha, hello Bali".

"Instead of allowing the Doha round to be replaced with a patchwork of regional deals, the WTO’s boss, Pascal Lamy, should close it and resurrect the best bits in a “Global Recovery Round”. He should drop the all-or-nothing “single undertaking” rule that helped kill Doha. Instead, talks would be broken up into small chunks and allowed to progress independently of one another. Negotiations would be open, so that any member could leave or join. Some deals, therefore, would not include everyone. But another of the WTO’s guiding principles—the “most-favoured-nation” clause—must apply. This rule means that any deal between a smaller group must be applied to all WTO members, even if they do not reciprocate. WTO-brokered regionalism would thus lower trade barriers for all. 

The Global Recovery Round should focus on manufacturing and services. Manufacturing represents around 55% of total trade. There is much to be gained: tariffs on cars, buses and bicycles are still high. Even low-tariff countries maintain a selection of high ones. In America ski boots attract a zero tariff, but golf shoes can face a 10% rate, and steel-toe-capped boots 37.5%. Services, which account for only 20% of world trade but are more important on a value-added basis, have hardly been liberalised at all."

Calling for a "Global Recovery Round" of multilateral trade talks, the way forward offered is:

1. Abandon the "single-undertaking" rule.

2. Move forward in specific areas independently of reach other and then apply the most-favoured nation principle. (How this would be acceptable to countries is difficult to fathom.)

3. Focus more on manufacturing and services and less on agriculture.

Pascal Lamy recently indicated that there were signs of a renewed interest n breaking the impasse.

"At this juncture, I believe we can and must explore those spaces, areas or topics on which we can make progress. We need to explore any and all options, small as they may be, for incremental progress on the negotiating agenda. Taking small steps now will be crucial for the credibility of the rule-making capacity of the WTO tomorrow. And as we take these small steps, we must also look at the wider picture, at the areas where progress has been more elusive, and start exploring and testing new approaches, including on so-called more intractable issues, to deliver results."

Whether Bali in 2013 would be the forum that where this can be achieved is debatable. A new WTO chief, a Global Recovery Round and lesser protectionism - hopeful prescriptions for 2013?

Doha retreating? - Bhagwati and the future of dispute settlement

Jagdish Bhagwati writing in The American Interest narrates the reasons for the failure of the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations inspire of more than a decade of sustained deliberations. While the reasons for the failure are many, Bhagwati narrates the various options that countries had in terms of concluding the Doha round and the main causes for the impasse. 

"Where does that leave us, however? There is great complacency that the fall of Doha is no cause for lament and that the WTO as the apex institution for trade will survive intact. It is as if loss of faith in Catholicism will not affect the Vatican. Doha has three legs: multilateral liberalization; framing of trading rules; and the Dispute Settlement Mechanism. The first is now broken. In turn, it cannot but break the other two."

This raises many concerns for the Dispute Settlement mechanism. It is considered the crown jewel of the WTO. However, what impact does the failure of the Doha round have on the existing judicial process. Some believe that the DSM would be unaffected and would continue to do what it does best - judicially interpret existing texts and adjudicate disputes systematically. Others, like Bhagwati, believe that it would have a negative impact on the DSM. When the political side of the multilateral system fails to change with changing times, the pressure is on the judicial wing to address new realities as well as address new concerns. This puts a lot of pressure on treaty interpretation as well as the judicial system. It can also lead to "judicial activism" wherein the adjudicatory bodies overstep their limits to address inadequacies of existing rules. While judicial activism in the national context is accepted by different institutions as inevitable and constitutionally mandated, how would a strong, forceful and often "judicially active" panel and Appellate Body be viewed by member countries/ Would it lead to increased compliance to international trade law or a growing discontent and non-compliance? Will the DSM be able to withstand the pressure of such non-compliance?

Another danger that is predicted with the failure of Doha is the rise of PTAs and their impact on the DSM. Bhagwati notes:

"In the absence of MTNs like Doha, these PTAs will also become the arrangements where rules such as anti-dumping and subsidies codes will be set and will then be muscled into WTO at Geneva. Similarly, the Dispute Settlement Mechanism at the WTO, a proud achievement in 1995, will also be in danger of falling into disuse as bilateral and regional dispute settlement arrangements will take over: and where the hegemons will expect that this asymmetric power will get them more favourable adjudication. None of this is cause for celebration; rather it calls for lamentation."

Thus, this would lead to the DSM gradually becoming irrelevant in multilateral trade relations. What would be the future of the DSM in the absence of a renewed successful negotiation in the coming years? Would it be strengthened or wither away into oblivion? Would it remain the crown jewel or just a disused bracelet?  Time, as usual, will tell.

A mini-package for trade possible?

I had recently blogged about the 'Trade Facilitation Agreement" that could provide a way to conclude the long drawn Doha impasse. WOuld it provide the much needed impetus to the political negotiations and provide the much needed boost and credibility to the multilateral negotiation framework?

Sungjoon Cho seems to think so. In his piece titled "A new trade pact for the 21st century" he reiterates the need to quickly finish this "mini-package" of a trade deal to save the Doha impasse. Though this agreement will not address all the vexed, intractable issues that is keeping the Doha round undecided, it would provide for the much needed reprieve it is badly in need of. Atleast, something would be agreed upon.Trade Facilitation itself has a huge potential to ease restrictions and make trade easier and less cumbersome.

"The trade-facilitation agreement is a timely response to this evolved pattern of trade characterized by global supply chains. Customs procedure paperwork amounts to 10 percent of the value of any trade transaction. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the pact would cut those costs by half, which is expected to shower global businesses with an amazing $900 billion gain.

Finally, the trade-facilitation deal would be an ideal fit with the Doha Round's underappreciated "development" mandate. As WTO Deputy Director-General Valentine Rugwabiza recently highlighted, "reduced transit and transaction costs would be especially beneficial to small and medium-size enterprises operating in landlocked countries," such as those in Africa."

WiIl the WTO members tread this path of picking the low-hanging fruit or is the impasse so deep that no benefit is foreseeable in negotiations? In the context of my earlier post, I had raised these issues:

1. On a more pessimistic note, does trade facilitation impact developing countries and the developed world equally? It is seen that less developed countries and some developing countries have archaic trade procedures that impact both their exporters and importers. Trade Facilitation will help simplify non-transparent rules and procedures. Is this a way of increasing access of developing countries markets to the developed world? The developed world already has better trade procedures which may not be impacted by the Trade Facilitation Agreement.

2. One area where the Trade Facilitation Agreement will certainly help is capacity building and infrastructure support to improve trading and reducing transaction costs. If it helps a poor exporter from a developing country to access developed markets, the Trade Facilitation Agreement is a welcome relief. However, the impact should not be one sided - improving access to developing countries markets while the developed markets remain a distant reality.

Ofcourse, this Agreement may not be the most ideal solution to take multilateral trade forward. But it seems to be the only way? Can this be the "mini-light" at the end of a long dark tunnel? As Sungjoon Cho states, "Still, it could at least close the longest trade round ever negotiated, restore the WTO's trustworthiness, promote development and ready the WTO for the future."

Doha negotiations - Need to change gears?

The Doha round of multilateral negotiations has been going on for a decade now. When will it come to an end? Will the impasses continue for a few more years? A study by Christoph Moser and Andrew Rose titled "Why do trade negotiations take so long?" have articulated the view that it takes longer to conclude multilateral talks when more countries are involved. This is not good news for the Doha round. Comparing the time taken for different GATT rounds, it is interesting to note that the first three GATT rounds which had 19, 20 and 33 members in total took only 8 months to complete. Contrast that with the Uruguay Round that took 91 months with 125 members involved in the negotiations. While one third of countries in the first three rounds were developing countries, now about two third of the countries belong to the developing world.

The above study provides a graphical depiction of the survival rate of Regional Trade Agreements compared to the days of negotiation indicating that it is also inversely proportional to the time taken for their completion as indicated in this figure below:

The reasons for the delay in conclusion of the Doha Round can be attributed to a number of factors:

1. With more than 150 countries participating in the negotiations, there are bound to be divergent interests and hard positions.

2. The developing world is far more active in these negotiations as compared to the earlier rounds leading to increased possibilities of an impasse.

3. The issues themselves are becoming more complex and contentious. While the earlier rounds were more about tariff liberalisation, the present rounds touch on more complex issues of trade, development and access. 

One would have to wait and see if the Doha round of negotiations can break the direct co relation between the length of a negotiation and its poor survival rate.


Pascal Lamy recently highlighted the need to move forward in this regard:

"Those of you who believe that, as time passes, inexorably, the Round might lose all its remaining steam may be right, whether we like it or not. What is clear, in my view, is that not engaging seriously in trying to find solutions to the present impasse will increase the probability of such a disappointing outcome. Credibility lies in the capacity to produce results, not statements. We should all face up to this reality and accept that there is no individual clever escape from this collective responsibility. As we break for the summer, I would urge each of you to reflect on your individual contribution towards collectively breaking the deadlock and allowing for forward movement in our work to fully operationalize the guidance we received at MC8 from our Ministers."

Only time will tell if the gears will be changed in this regard. 

21st Century trade and WTO

The failure of the Doha negotiations has raised many issues about the future of the WTO. Will the WTO continue to remain as an effective multilateral institution playing a relevant role in 21st century trade? I have blogged here about the view that the future of the WTO is bright inspite of the current negotiation impasse. While many believe that the WTO continues to perform many functions like trade monitoring and dispute resolution which remain unaffected by the failure of the negotiations, others acknowledge that there is a dent in the the institution's credibility due to the impasse. To what extent has the failure of the Doha round affected multilateralism?

The WTO website has a public forum inviting comments on this issue titled "Is Multilateralism in Crisis?". Richard Baldwin has a well written piece titled "21st century trade and global trade governance: The WTO’s future" wherein he brings to the fore the emerging trends of 21st century trade comprising of international supply chains. Arguing that the failureof the negotiations does not reflect anti-liberalisation sentiment,  WTO's unpopularity or it's irrelevance, he attributes the failure of the WTO to address issues of 21st century trade that is the main issue.

 He characterises 21st Century trade thus:

"This essay argues that the WTO’s woes stem rather from the emergence of a new type of trade — call it 21st century trade. This new trade is intimately tied to the unbundling of production (global value chains). It has reshaped the geography of global production. And — since joining a supply chain is the fast route to industrialisation — unbundling is also at the heart of emerging market growth, which has in turned reshaped the geography of global demand.

21st century trade requires disciplines that go far beyond those in the WTO’s rulebook. To date, virtually all of the necessary governance has emerged spontaneously in regional trade agreements or via unilateral ‘pro-business’ policy reforms by developing nations. The real threat, therefore, is not failure of the WTO, but rather the erosion of its centricity in the world trade system."

He paints two scenarios for the WTO - one which addresses only 20th century trade and ignores the reality of 21st century trade and the other where the WTO plays a crucial part in shaping and engaging with new trade realities.21st Century trade is characterised by the demands for new rules and disciplines governing the nexus of trade, investment, services, intellectual property, and business mobility which are being formulated outside the WTO in Regional Trade Agreements.

"This line of reasoning suggests the WTO’s future will take one of two forms.

1) The WTO remains relevant for 20th century trade and the basic rules of the road, but irrelevant for 21st century trade; all ‘next generation’ issues are addressed elsewhere.

In the optimistic version of this scenario, which seems to be where the current trajectory is leading us, the WTO remains one of several pillars of world trade governance. This sort of outcome is familiar from the EU’s three-pillar structure, where the first pillar (basically the disciplines agreed in treaties up the 1992 Maastricht Treaty) was supplemented by two new pillars to cover new areas of cooperation.¹ In the pessimistic version of this first scenario, the lack of progress undermines political support and the WTO disciplines start to be widely flouted; the bicycle, so to speak, falls over when forward motion halts.

The second scenario involves a reinvigoration of the WTO’s centricity.

2) The WTO engages in 21st century trade issues both by crafting new multilateral disciplines — or at least general guidelines — on matters such as investment assurances and by multilateralising some of the new disciplines that have arisen in regional trade agreements. 

There are many variants of this future outlook. The engagement could take the form of plurilaterals — following the lead of agreements like the Information Technology Agreement, the Government Procurement Agreement and the like (where only a subset of WTO members sign up to the disciplines). It could also take the form of an expansion of the Doha Round agenda to include some of the new issues that are now routinely considered in regional trade agreements."

Which way will the WTO go? Will it remain an institution of the 21st century addressing trade needs of the 20th century or will it play a more pivotal role in guiding and shaping 21st century trade rules? The pressures on the dispute settlement system with the first approach would be telling. When the rule making does not reflect the new realities of trade, it is left to judicial bodies to interpret and re-interpret existing rules to reflect reality. Will this not lead to new tensions? To what extent can the judicial function reflect realities? What essentially is a political question of negotiation, concession and rule making will fall on the rule based dispute resolution system. The coming years will see the WTO either addressing this dichotomy or facing the dilemma of this dichotomy.

The debate around UNCTAD

Amid the controversy of a letter  written by former staff of the UNCTAD, the UNCTAD XIII Conference recently concluded in Doha. It produced what is called the Doha Manar. Stressing on development centred globalisation, the mandate, in the context of the importance of the multilateral trading system, stated:

"Our deliberations at Doha have clustered around four major themes relating to development-centred globalization. Firstly, we agree on the need to enhance the enabling economic environment at all levels in support of inclusive and sustainable growth and development. In this regard, international trade is an engine of economic growth and socio- economic development. The multilateral trading system must remain open, rules-based, transparent, non-discriminatory and inclusive to serve especially as a bulwark against all forms of protectionism. The successful conclusion of the WTO Doha Development Agenda remains crucial. Accession to WTO by developing countries, in particular the least developed countries (LDCs), and countries with economies in transition, enhances the universality of the trading system. A robust and development-oriented multilateral trading system is essential. In addition, the efforts towards appropriate reform and continued improvement of the international financial system are, we recognize, as difficult as they are urgent, and are the shared responsibility of all.

It concluded by placing development of countries as the cornerstone of globalisation:

" Development is a universal concern today, and development-centred globalization is our common cause. We recognize the need to make our common economic life more conducive to progressive structural change, more productive of inclusive and sustainable growth and development, and more effective in fostering broad-based inclusion in a new and more robust social contract. We are also cognizant of the differences in capabilities and resources available to nations in different development circumstances, which mean that nations will have different roles in building our common future. But we must all participate equitably in shaping the global economy to support this new consensus for development-centred globalization."

News reports extensively covered the Conference as well as the salient features of the resolution. The issue of the relevance of UNCTAD and debate around the scope and mandate of the institution was widely reported here , here  and here . The Doha Manar itself, was apparently concluded after a lot of last minute deliberation. As one report put it:

"After intense negotiations, which ended at 05:00 on the last day of the Conference, developing countries managed to get agreement on a text that did not alter fundamentally UNCTAD’s mandate. The crucial paragraph calls for UNCTAD to “continue, as a contribution to the work of the UN, research and analysis on the prospects of, and impact on, developing countries in matters of trade and development, in light of the global economic and financial crisis.” Commenting on this, the participating NGOs stated that “as civil society, we celebrate that this Declaration language gives a clear mandate to UNCTAD to continue its excellent and highly lauded work on the global economic crisis.”

The intense debate  over the mandate of UNCTAD and its role in the context of other multilateral institutions is interesting. Is the UNCTAD more "development" oriented as compared to the IMF, World Bank, OECD or WTO? Does it represent the interests of the developing countries more? Do the other institutions represent a particular ideological position as compared to UNCTAD? Is the language and paradigm of the UNCTAD's world view more critical of trade liberalisation without barriers and without addressing developmental needs than other multilateral institutions? How does one view the rule based multilateral system in the context of UNCTAD's mandate? Are they compiimentary or contradictory? While Doha failed in the context of the WTO, it succeeded in reaching a conclusion in the case of UNCTAD. Is this because the latter was more to do with broad principles of guidance the former negotiations was involved in specific rules that would govern trade? Is it a case of institutional jurisdictional overlap?

Future of WTO - Bright?

With the failure of the Doha negotiations in December 2011, pessimists began questioning the efficacy and relevance of the multilateral trading system and the institutional framework contained in the WTO. The Doha Manar resolution, of the UNCTAD XIII, is in stark contrast in terms of producing a result, albeit theoretical and as a source of general guidance. While many argue that the WTO's relevance and significant role continues due to the monitoring and implementation of the present WTO Agreements as well as the rule based dispute settlement mechanism, there are those who believe that the multilateral institution is at the cross road due to the failure of the negotiations and rise in regional trade agreements.

In a detailed policy brief for the Peterson Institute, Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J.Schott titled "Will the World Trade Organisation enjoy a Bright future?" provide an optimistic picture of the WTO and its future in spite of the present impasse in negotiations. Suggesting a flexible approach for looking at bargains that can be clinched on which substantial progress has been done during the last ten years (without insisting on the single undertaking approach - all or none) and focusing on plurilateral agreements that can address issues in critical areas of trade and environment, services liberalisation, currency undervaluation, zero to zero tariffs in specific sectors, digital economy and state owned enterprises.

In conclusion they recommend:

"We propose a grand bargain that couples a significant harvest from the Doha agenda with the future negotiation of plurilateral agreements among WTO members willing to take rewarding, yet challenging, steps forward. Five parts of the Doha agenda should be agreed immediately: trade facilitation, dutyfree, quota-free treatment of imports from least developed countries, phaseout of agricultural subsidies, discipline of farm export controls, and reforms to dispute settlement. These measures cause little economic pain to any WTO member while delivering benefits to all. One plurilateral agreement is already in motion. In early January 2012, a group of 16 countries—including the EU-27, the United States, Australia, Taiwan, and Singapore— met to discuss plans for a services plurilateral agreement, under Article V of the GATS but outside the Doha agenda. These talks should set the stage for plurilateral negotiations on a range of other pressing issues, several identified in this Policy Brief. 

Our analysis indicates that plurilateral agreements on services liberalization, WTO-IMF coordination on currency undervaluation, greenhouse gas and energy measures, zerofor-zero tariffs and limits on behind-the-border barriers for trade in select industrial sectors, and rules of the road for SOEs are promising next steps. While each of these topics presents unique negotiating challenges, we recommend three common features for future plurilaterals, both to promote negotiations and to give the agreements more bite. First, the plurilateral agreements should be “inside” the WTO. This increases the likelihood they will eventually become universal and meanwhile ensures access to legally binding dispute settlement procedures. Second, the plurilaterals should extend their benefits on conditional MFN basis to nonmembers. This both eliminates the “free rider” problem and provides a strong incentive for wider membership. Finally, we recommend that the trade or subject coverage of each plurilateral should extend to “substantial” portion of world commerce (a minimum of around 40 percent), not necessarily a “critical mass” (often interpreted as 90 percent coverage). The “critical mass” threshold was not articulated in the Marrakesh Agreement as a requirement for a waiver from the unconditional MFN rule; moreover, the GPA demonstrates that significant liberalization does not depend on covering a “critical mass” of countries. 

We conclude where we started. The WTO can have a bright future, but it cannot rely solely on its proven competence as a judicial body nor its acknowledged expertise in gathering statistics and analyzing trends. Crowning these strengths, the WTO must launch a new era of trade and investment negotiations. Other promising approaches may exist, but we think that plurilateral agreements on pressing global issues offer an excellent path forward."

The policy brief discusses many ways of getting out of the impasse - to step back and look at the gains and go on multiple tracks of plurilateral agreements (like the Government Procurement Agreement). The suggestions on State Owned Enterprises reinforce the ideological position of the State's limited role in development as against the role of the market and may need more critical analysis. Overall the steps suggested do offer a starting point for a fresh look at where the negotiators left off at Doha. It is one thing to say that the WTO is live and kicking because of its "crown jewel" - the DSM; it is quite an other thing to achieve fresh progress in negotiations to give a fresh lease of life to the multilateral trading system. After all,  however well the dispute settlement mechanism functions, beyond a point, it cannot exist in a vacuum where the political negotiations are not addressing realities of international trade. That would lead to a situation of judicial overreach that may threaten the system as a whole. The approach suggests a middle path - no single undertaking, work on the progress achieved and aim for plurilateral agreements.

Treading the middle path?

The WTO website today quoted the Chair of the General Council reporting as follows :

"Thank you all for coming to this informal meeting.  We are now less than three weeks from the start of MC8.  You will recall that the last time we met in this format I announced that I would begin consultations on possible elements for Ministers’ political guidance under the first two boxes in my template — the Importance of the Multilateral Trading System and the WTO, and, Trade and Development.  The third box, on the DDA, is under the responsibility of the Director-General.
During this most recent phase in my consultative process I have met repeatedly with all the Group coordinators, with a large number of individual delegations and with delegations in various group formats including a focus group of Members covering a broad range of the membership.  I have also coordinated this work with the Chairs of the Subsidiary Bodies, who have done some very valuable work.  I thank them.   As ever, my door has also remained open for any delegation wishing to meet me and a number of you have taken advantage of this.  And I want to reaffirm that, according to our principles of transparency and inclusiveness, it is only the full membership who can reach consensus.  It is in keeping with these principles that I want to give you an account of the elements that have emerged from my consultations so far and hear your views. 
In presenting these elements to you, I want to be very clear.  Let me stress that these elements need to be considered as “work in progress”.  I am not presenting them as anything that they are not.  They represent a possible minimum level of convergence but clearly we cannot claim that they are agreed yet.  Whether we can build further on them is up to you, the Members.  Before I report on the substance of these elements, I wish to inform you that my statement will be circulated after this meeting so you will have an accurate account. 
On the first theme on the Importance of MTS and WTO: First, I have heard the need to emphasize the value of the rules-based multilateral trading system, to strengthen it and to make it more responsive to the needs of Members, especially in the current challenging global economic environment, in order to stimulate economic growth, employment and development.
Second, I have also heard the need to reaffirm the importance of the WTO’s role in keeping markets open and to resist protectionism.  In this regard Members have pointed to the DG’s report on recent developments in the trading system. 
I have also heard the need to stress the importance of the work of regular WTO bodies.  Particular points which emerged in this connection were their role in the oversight of implementing existing Agreements; dispute avoidance and encouraging transparency through monitoring and reporting, and as a forum for the consideration of trade-related issues raised by Members.  I have also seen support for strengthening and improving the functioning of the regular bodies.
With regard to the Dispute Settlement System, my consultations have shown Members recognize that it is an important asset and are committed to strengthening it, including through concluding the DSU review negotiations.
Everyone I have consulted so far welcomes the accession of Vanuatu, Samoa and the Russian Federation.  I noted a widespread recognition that accession contributes to strengthening the multilateral trading system.  There was also broad support for committing to efforts to facilitate accession, in particular those of LDCs.  And I am sure we all welcome the outcome of recent work in the LDC Sub-Committee. 
Turning to the second theme on Trade and Development, I have seen that development is a core element of the WTO’s work and that there is need for focused work in the relevant WTO bodies, in particular the CTD, to further examine the positive link between trade and development. 
I have seen wide recognition of the need to further integrate developing countries, particularly LDCs and small and vulnerable economies, into the multilateral trading system.
Also, with regard to LDCs, I saw convergence on the need to acknowledge their needs and to commit to ensuring that their interests are given due priority in the future work of the WTO.
There was also convergence that S&D provisions are an integral part of the WTO agreements and that the Doha mandate to review them with a view to strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and operational should be fulfilled.  In my consultations Members have also reiterated the importance of expediting work towards finalising the Monitoring Mechanism for S&D treatment.
On Aid for Trade, there was convergence on the need to take note of progress made and of the Third Global Aid for Trade Review.  From what I have heard in my consultations, there also appears to be convergence to maintain, beyond 2011, Aid for Trade levels that at least reflect the average of the period 2006 - 2008.  Also in the context of Aid for Trade, I have noted readiness to work with development banks to ensure the availability of trade finance to low income countries.  With regard to the WTO Global Trust Fund, my consultations have shown commitment to continue funding it in a predictable and timely manner to enable the Secretariat to continue to provide the required Technical Assistance and Capacity Building. 
I thought I would share with you these elements and get your feedback before I report to the General Council.  Clearly they are rather general in nature and I am sure many of you would like to make them more specific.  However my consultations have shown that convergence becomes more elusive the higher the level of specificity.  As always I remain in your hands, but if we are to build on these elements in the very short time remaining there will be need for more flexibility and understanding from each of you.  
Given the general understanding that MC8 is not to going be a negotiating meeting, and the need to provide for adequate preparation for your Ministers, there is a need for us to take stock of where we have got to sufficiently in advance of the Ministerial.  As you all know, I have always worked on the basis that our benchmark in this process should be the level of success we can reach.  In other words, that we continue our efforts to build incremental convergence up until it is clear we cannot go further.  I have heard from many delegations that this means the General Council of 30 November.  Their view is that whatever level of convergence we have reached by then on the elements of political guidance in all three areas — systemic, development and DDA — will be what goes to the Ministers for their endorsement.  This would be in line with the “no surprises” principle.
Of course agreeing to such a limit to our convergence-seeking process does not mean that issues on which there is no convergence are forgotten.  Ministers are free to pursue them in their speeches, as can delegations in the future.  It just means that we enable our Ministers to have an orderly meeting.
Another idea which has been gaining support in my consultations relates to the outcome document.  The idea to have a Conference Chair’s statement which would have two parts — one would be the elements on which we have reached consensus, and the other would be the Chair’s summary of the main points he has heard in the Ministerial discussions.
I intend to hold a further informal HoDs meeting on Tuesday 29 November where we can take stock of progress in all three political guidance boxes — systemic, development and DDA.  Together with the Director-General, I will be preparing this meeting through further consultations.  We will also need to take up a number of administrative issues related to the Ministerial at that meeting."

Attempt to bring convergence or treading the middle path?