Friday, June 1, 2012

Alvaro Santos, Robert Howse and Andrew Lang on Domestic Policy space and WTO - Brilliant exchange

I was delighted to see an Online symposium in Opinio Juris on Alvaro Santos' article on domestic policy space and the WTO. The discussion on the article by two leading international trade law luminaries Robert Howse and Andrew Lang was extremely enriching and very engaging. I had written about the article in a blog piece here. In this blog I will reflect on this interesting exchange as well as my thoughts on the issues involved.

In his original article titled "Carving Out Policy Autonomy for Developing Countries in the World Trade organisation : The Examples of Brazil and Mexico" Alvaro essentially argues that there is sufficient policy space within the WTO Agreements for developing countries to pursue their developmental agenda provided they are legally equipped and capacity to engage with the multilateral system is strengthened. Providing a synopsis of this stand Alvaro in the Opinio Juris piece states:
"In “Carving Out Policy Autonomy for Developing Countries in the World Trade Organization: The Experience of Brazil and Mexico”, I argue against the commonly held assumption that WTO legal obligations overly restrict countries’ regulatory autonomy. Despite the presence of restrictions, I claim that there is still flexibility in the system for countries to carve out regulatory space for themselves. That countries can expand their policy autonomy means that governments of developing countries have more agency and responsibility than development scholars typically admit. At the same time, however, the asymmetry of power and resources between countries does affect their experience in the system and thus influences the outcomes to a greater extent than liberal trade scholars usually acknowledge.
         ...
However, to show that countries subjected to similar international obligations can pursue divergent trade and development policies is to make clear that there is policy space and that this space can be put to different uses with divergent outcomes. Developing countries’ governments should bear responsibility — and their citizens should hold them accountable — for the kind of developing strategy they pursue, or refrain from pursuing, within the international trade regime."
The basic thrust of this piece is that, subject to certain limitations, WTO rules do afford sufficient domestic policy space for developing countries to pursue their developmental agendas and as part of the strategic lawyering that is proposed, it is suggested that it should be part of this overall developmental discourse.


Robert Howse while giving the example of compulsory licensing in the TRIPS Agreement as an example of policy autonomy broadly agrees with the view that the WTO rules offer sufficient policy space. He comments on the lack of expertise of WTO law in many countries which perhaps hinder the serious engagement of many countries in the dispute settlement system as well as postulates the need for taking forward the learnings of Brazil and mexico to other countries.

"In some countries, there is no independent expertise about WTO law. The government and the people only hear the views of officials who have been more or less inducted into the global trade policy elite, or those of the WTO Secretariat, or those of interests who are using the notion of WTO illegality to block a policy they oppose for other reasons. Today, however, NGOs are playing an increasingly useful role in entering policy debates and contesting interpretations that are particularly restrictive of policy space (ICTSD’s work on TRIPs is a good example). To be able to do this NGOs had to reposition themselves at least partly from being anti-globalization advocates trying to oppose and delegitimate the system to knowledgeable and shrewd lawyers who see the tensions, flexibilities, and balances in the existing norms that can be a basis for contestation within the legal framework as it stands. I am still struck by how journalists (many, though not all), who can be important in transmitting the meaning of WTO law in a domestic policy debate, will go to the same experts-mostly trade officials, lobbyists, or retired officials, and a few professors who are also consultants or closely connected to the WTO Secretariat-and take their views as the correct ones concerning the meaning of WTO law."
Andrew Lang while agreeing with the broad principle the existence of policy autonomy within the WTO also highlights the need for analysing the receptivity of the dispute settlement mechanism to respond to the development strategies of the developing world. In other words, he states that "the power to shape the interpretation of the law in WTO dispute settlement, in other words, is not just a function of the legal capacities of the parties to a dispute, but also about the structural conditions which make certain legal arguments appear more convincing, persuasive, institutionally appropriate, textually grounded, and so on to legal interpreters." He makes the important point that in the coming decade the importance of the dispute settlement bodies is going to become very crucial and central to global trading and will need to respond to the growing strategic lawyering that Alvaro's article talks about.
"A related thought has to do with the pressures that this project will place on the WTO dispute settlement system. Alvaro, and other writing in this area, are right to say that struggles over the interpretation of WTO law are likely to become an even more central aspect of global trade politics over the next decades, partly as a result of more and more Members building their legal capacity in precisely the way Alvaro describes. Is the dispute settlement system equipped at present to respond to the challenges that this will pose? Does it currently possess a sufficient set of juridical tools and techniques to carve out both a legitimate and effective role for itself as it finds itself ever closer to the centre of trade politics? One of the tasks for the next decade or so it to try to craft a way of ‘doing law’ in international economic governance which bears the weight that strategies such as those described in this article will necessarily place on it."
Andrew Lang ends with a different idea in terms of the absence of the notion of Autonomy itself in a globalised world wherein national policy choices are determined by a host of international factors, WTO law being only one of them. Proposing a radical shift in perception, he proposes that positive experimental domestic autonomy and institutional pluralism should be advocated rather than the "negative" restraint on autonomy by the WTO rules. What this would entail, I assume, is that the international economic order will be based on pluralism of national economic policies rather than an exception of autonomy to globalised rules at present. I am not very sure how that translates into multilateral trade rules, non-discrimination and lack of protectionism? 

"A related thought has to do with the pressures that this project will place on the WTO dispute settlement system. Alvaro, and other writing in this area, are right to say that struggles over the interpretation of WTO law are likely to become an even more central aspect of global trade politics over the next decades, partly as a result of more and more Members building their legal capacity in precisely the way Alvaro describes. Is the dispute settlement system equipped at present to respond to the challenges that this will pose? Does it currently possess a sufficient set of juridical tools and techniques to carve out both a legitimate and effective role for itself as it finds itself ever closer to the centre of trade politics? One of the tasks for the next decade or so it to try to craft a way of ‘doing law’ in international economic governance which bears the weight that strategies such as those described in this article will necessarily place on it."
Finally Alvaro has brilliantly responded to the two responses. Reiterating his stand that developing countries should use the existing legal frameworks to pursue policy autonomy, he states:

Finally, a word on the character of policy autonomy. Lang calls policy autonomy an illusion because international law –or multiple layers of transnational legal regimes- to some extent already structures countries’ economic policy choices when it comes to trade-related regulations. We can imagine procedural rules about sovereignty, state responsibility, jurisdiction and treaty-making, or overlapping substantive regimes of investment and finance, to name a few. So, a country is never entirely free from constrains. I think that diagnosis is right although once made visible, a country might also be able to influence those background legal regimes that affect its choices on trade measures.

At any rate, it might be that Lang’s understanding of policy autonomy and mine are not so far apart. I see policy autonomy not as some limitless or pre-regulatory status that developing countries should strive to inhabit but as a quest for empowerment within the existing international regulatory regimes that could yield better consequences for them. The call is not for disengagement but for a different kind of engagement. If there were a rallying cry it would not be “leave me alone” but “let me experiment and thrive in the system”."
This interesting exchange throws open many issues in the context of the engagement of developing countries in the WTO? What are the limits to domestic policy choice within the WTO. While it is recognised that WTO rules do provide for domestic autonomy, what are the contours and limits of it? Are there certain fundamental principles that even domestic policy choice cannot question? Can we generalise on these limits or do they depend on the facts of each case that are brought to the dispute settlement body? WTO law and interpretation are becoming increasingly complex quagmire of legalese and requirement of legal expertise is a sine qua non for effectively engaging with the trading system. Engaging and using domestic policy autonomy would perforce require a thorough understanding of the law as well as its nuanced interpretation. How many developing countries are capable of this journey? Is the domestic, political regime prepared for such an engagement? 

Another issue of recognising domestic policy autonomy within the WTO regime is to understand that the developed world too would be using this same policy space for protecting their interests. In today's globalised world as much as developing countries are markets for the developed world, developing countries are increasingly exploring markets in the developed world.  Further, using domestic policy space by another country has serious impact on an exporting countries exports. There will be essential trade offs a country will have to make. While using its domestic policy space in a particular context will serve its domestic developmental agenda, the use by another country will affect its trade interests which also may be part of its developmental agenda. How does one reconcile these interests? While countries want to protect domestic industry within WTO rules and it is a legitimate claim, they want reduced barriers and access to markets when their exports are affected. How does one balance the two policy choices of a developmental agenda and market access? In other words, where should the line between domestic policy space, protectionism and innovative interpretation of WTO rules be drawn? Can there be a legitimate domestic policy choice on the grounds of protecting one's domestic industry as part of a country's developmental agenda? Would it be permissible even if it is discriminatory vis a vis foreign competitors? Is there a danger of increased protectionism by the developed world (or even the developing world) by innovative policy autonomy interpretation that the developing world may not be able to use because of a lack of legal capacity? 

Is the assumption that reduced barriers to trade is not in the interests of developing countries? Is the assumption that international trade is not an ally of a country's developmental agenda? Isn't it possible that domestic policy autonomy is hijacked by "hegemonic" national business interests which may not always be co-terminus with national interests? At times domestic policy choice is not guided by developmental agendas but by vested interests to keep international competition at bay. Is this also a permissible domestic policy choice that a developing country should adopt? Does domestic business interest always constitute national interest?


One of the extremely positive outcomes I see from this exchange is the possibility of Law Schools providing independent, "development friendly" advice to developing countries to engage with the WTO. As Alvaro stated:
"Moreover, beyond the role of developing country governments and NGOs, Howse makes clear that there is also a role for legal scholars to play. I am enthusiastic about his idea of using law school clinics to provide independent and development-friendly legal advice to countries in need of counsel for WTO litigation and to other groups, like NGOs, for domestic policy debates about the meaning of WTO obligations. I am on board and hope that this exchange could be the beginning of a project of that sort."
I would be excited to study the journey of India and other developing countries in their use of the Dispute Settlement mechanism to further developmental agendas.It would be worthwhile to study a few developing countries engagement with the DSM in relation to their developmental paradigms like Alvaro did for Mexico and Brazil. One will have to go into the specific examples of measures taken and whether the domestic measure was part of the larger developmental agenda or a purely "protectionist" measure. I would indeed watch very keenly the progress of this project as it seeks to bring international law from its "rarified" confines as many see it to "grassroot" domestic policy making and the rigours of democratic political compulsions.






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