Thursday, June 25, 2020

Some weekday readings on WTO, trade and China!

Some reports on trade, WTO and China's growth in the global sphere made interesting weekday reading:

Politico reports that there may be soon a Congressional vote in July on whether US should stay in the WTO. Like earlier attempts, this might just be another damp squib.
Why it matters: The decision means lawmakers will be forced to go on the record either in favor or against withdrawing from the WTO, which the Trump administration has frequently accused of being unfair to the United States.
The push to get out of the WTO comes as the United States and the 163 other members of the organization are in midst of selecting a new director general to succeed Roberto Azevêdo, who is leaving at the end of August.
Opponents of the resolutions say U.S. withdrawal from the WTO would give Beijing more influence, not less, over the global trading environment. The measures also ignore the leading role that the United States played in creating the WTO and its predecessor organization, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, those opponents say.
Some news in the Huffingtonpost of churning of who handles trade related matters in the UK amidst Brexit talks and the emergence of a possibility of a US-UK trade deal. No matter which economy, there continues to exist the tension between economic diplomacy and foreign diplomacy. Some get reported, some don't. The talk of rejigging the Department of International Trade in the UK, after the Department of International Development merged with the Foreign Ministry is found here:

“What is also clear is that we have to speak with one voice internationally, which is why I’m working very closely with the foreign secretary, which is why our trade commissioners are working closely with local ambassadors and high commissioners. And I am focused on getting this job done and realising those opportunities.” 
The Washington Post has this "WTO for dummies" piece on why the next WTO DG needs to be in place to save the crumbling world economic order. It argues:

If members can align behind a candidate committed to modernization, it could break bureaucratic logjams and help unleash a wave of global growth at a time when it is needed most. If no such candidate can be found, the WTO risks further receding into irrelevance.

 

Res ipsa loquitur?

And finally, this masterpiece on China's story over the centuries is a must read. The Council on Foreign Relations has brought out this illustrative piece on how China views itself in the world and it's rise in global geopolitics and institutions.Titled "China's Approach to Global Governance" it charts a centuries old journey and what the future holds for China in multilateral relations.
Over the last two decades, China has regained much of its influence in the world, as Beijing is making progress toward its dream of restoring what it sees as its rightful great power status. Beijing has built up its influence over global governance in particular, gaining a greater say within important organizations while also launching new initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative. China’s increased involvement in global governance expands its international political clout, helps it project soft power, and also promotes its domestic economic development.
In the future, if its economy continues to grow over the long term, China will more forcefully set the terms for global governance. It will wield greater power within long-standing organizations like the World Bank and United Nations and also will strengthen new, China-dominated institutions.
Beijing’s more assertive approach could enhance the international system. China could shoulder greater international responsibilities and prod global governance institutions to better represent the needs of emerging powers. It could facilitate international solutions on climate change in particular. And Beijing has shown, with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, that it can launch an institution that works within existing global governance norms.
But China’s increasingly assertive presence could prove divisive, especially in areas like development finance, where Beijing’s approach could marginalize existing institutions. Such divisions could paralyze collaboration in critical realms of global governance. And while in some areas, such as climate change, China does not try to impose its own visions and models, in areas of human rights and internet governance, Beijing tries to promote its own, more authoritarian norms. In May 2020, Beijing passed new legislation giving China extensive powers to crush dissent in Hong Kong, seriously threatening the special administrative region’s autonomy. If China (and Russia) can set the standards for internet governance, for instance, they could pave the way for other countries to embrace cyber sovereignty, sparking a divided world with two internets—one generally open and the other closed and favored by autocracies.
 Everyone is waiting to see how the fall out of the emerging power disruption - will it strengthen, equalise the multipolar world or will it lead to the re-emergence of blocs and divergent groupings poised for conflict. Or a more nuanced way to look at it is - issue based coalitions of the willing.




No comments: