EU ETS and International Trade Law - Some scholarly analysis finally!

The IELP Blog  had references to scholarly analysis of the EU ETS Scheme by Lorand Bartels, Robert Howse and Henri Joel Nkuepo. I have blogged about this issue (with my limited understanding) ad nauseum here, here, here and here. They were "generalist" blog pieces which had not deep dived into the legal ramifications of scheme in the context of WTO Agreements. Finally some scholarly analysis of the EU ETS scheme is available. Does the EU ETS Scheme contravene WTO Agreements, especially the GATT and GATS obligations?

Lorand Bartels' study titled  " The Inclusion of Aviation in the EU ETS - WTO Law considerations" and Robert Howses' comments analyse threadbare the scheme in the light of the GATT and GATS provisions. Lorand Bartels comes to the conclusion that though the Scheme may violate provisions mainly related to Article XI 1 (being a quantitative restriction) and Article I 1 (Most Favoured Nation treatment), the exceptions provided in Article XX (b) and (g) of GATT related to protection of human, animal and plant life and conservation of exhaustible natural resource justified the scheme. Detailing the applicability  of the Chapeau in Article XX of GATT, the piece provides a glimpse of the complexity of interpretation of the provision in relation to discrimination and regulation. As regards GATS obligation it concludes that assuming that the Scheme is covered by GATS and is justiciable it would be most likely to be justified under Article XIV (b) of GATS related to environmental exceptions.

Robert Howse in his commentary agrees with the above analysis and states:

" The WTO is the one international regime that has addressed specifically in its jurisprudence the legality of unilateral measures to protect the environmental commons. In the landmark Shrimp/Turtle ruling the Appellate landmark Shrimp/Turtle ruling the Appellate Body held that such measures are in principle compatible with the legal framework of the World Trade Organization; in practice, to be legal, they must be applied in a non arbit- rary, non-discriminatory and non-protectionist manner. Thus, I cannot but agree with the ultimate conclusion of Dr. Bartels’ article that the coverage of non-European carriers under the ETS is compatible with WTO law, assuming that its application to those carriers is operated in an even-handed and non-protectionist fashion."

 Henri Joel Nkuepo strikes a slightly divergent note in his working paper "EU ETS Aviation Discriminates Against Developing Countries" where he argues that by treating the airlines of developed and developing countries on the same footing, the EU ETS Directive actually discriminates against the developing countries. Though Article XX of GATT allows for environmental concerns it cannot be discriminatory or arbitrary. Henri argues that the Scheme by not recognising the differences in circumstances of the developing and developed world in terms of their technological capabilities in the aviation sector has in fact discriminated against the developing countries of the WTO. Treating unequals on an equal footing is also discrimination.

The two papers and comment offer interesting, contrasting insights into the complex nature of EU ETS obligations in the context of international trade law. To what extent can the concerns of the environment "distort" trade? What measures can be considered adequate, reasonable and not being restrictive of international trade? Who decides this crucial question? Is it within the realm of WTO jurisprudence at all? Is it the preserve of domestic decision making? As long as the measure is not discriminatory and arbitrary, can it be justified on the grounds of the environment? Is this principle extendable to other non-trade issues - labour rights, human rights, democracy? For example, if a few developed countries, hypothetically, impose a tax on imported goods not complying with certain labour standards (equally applicable to local goods, hence non-discriminatory) which in effect cannot be complied with in the developing world or if complied with will lead to the imported good being non-competitive or inefficient, would this be justifiable under the Article XX exception of "public morals"? Is it opening the window to "disguised" protectionism? Are non-discrimination, non-arbitrariness and reasonableness the only tests to justify the measure? How should one interpret the Chapeau text of Article XX, GATT - "unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail (emphasis added)"? Does it imply that when there are different conditions (including working conditions, technological advancement, cultural mores) a measure in a country, even on grounds of public morals or safety to human health, will be considered unjustifiably discriminatory? As Simon Lester said these are extremely complex issues and would, in all probability, require, a WTO dispute to get resolved!

Future of WTO - Bright?

With the failure of the Doha negotiations in December 2011, pessimists began questioning the efficacy and relevance of the multilateral trading system and the institutional framework contained in the WTO. The Doha Manar resolution, of the UNCTAD XIII, is in stark contrast in terms of producing a result, albeit theoretical and as a source of general guidance. While many argue that the WTO's relevance and significant role continues due to the monitoring and implementation of the present WTO Agreements as well as the rule based dispute settlement mechanism, there are those who believe that the multilateral institution is at the cross road due to the failure of the negotiations and rise in regional trade agreements.

In a detailed policy brief for the Peterson Institute, Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J.Schott titled "Will the World Trade Organisation enjoy a Bright future?" provide an optimistic picture of the WTO and its future in spite of the present impasse in negotiations. Suggesting a flexible approach for looking at bargains that can be clinched on which substantial progress has been done during the last ten years (without insisting on the single undertaking approach - all or none) and focusing on plurilateral agreements that can address issues in critical areas of trade and environment, services liberalisation, currency undervaluation, zero to zero tariffs in specific sectors, digital economy and state owned enterprises.

In conclusion they recommend:

"We propose a grand bargain that couples a significant harvest from the Doha agenda with the future negotiation of plurilateral agreements among WTO members willing to take rewarding, yet challenging, steps forward. Five parts of the Doha agenda should be agreed immediately: trade facilitation, dutyfree, quota-free treatment of imports from least developed countries, phaseout of agricultural subsidies, discipline of farm export controls, and reforms to dispute settlement. These measures cause little economic pain to any WTO member while delivering benefits to all. One plurilateral agreement is already in motion. In early January 2012, a group of 16 countries—including the EU-27, the United States, Australia, Taiwan, and Singapore— met to discuss plans for a services plurilateral agreement, under Article V of the GATS but outside the Doha agenda. These talks should set the stage for plurilateral negotiations on a range of other pressing issues, several identified in this Policy Brief. 

Our analysis indicates that plurilateral agreements on services liberalization, WTO-IMF coordination on currency undervaluation, greenhouse gas and energy measures, zerofor-zero tariffs and limits on behind-the-border barriers for trade in select industrial sectors, and rules of the road for SOEs are promising next steps. While each of these topics presents unique negotiating challenges, we recommend three common features for future plurilaterals, both to promote negotiations and to give the agreements more bite. First, the plurilateral agreements should be “inside” the WTO. This increases the likelihood they will eventually become universal and meanwhile ensures access to legally binding dispute settlement procedures. Second, the plurilaterals should extend their benefits on conditional MFN basis to nonmembers. This both eliminates the “free rider” problem and provides a strong incentive for wider membership. Finally, we recommend that the trade or subject coverage of each plurilateral should extend to “substantial” portion of world commerce (a minimum of around 40 percent), not necessarily a “critical mass” (often interpreted as 90 percent coverage). The “critical mass” threshold was not articulated in the Marrakesh Agreement as a requirement for a waiver from the unconditional MFN rule; moreover, the GPA demonstrates that significant liberalization does not depend on covering a “critical mass” of countries. 

We conclude where we started. The WTO can have a bright future, but it cannot rely solely on its proven competence as a judicial body nor its acknowledged expertise in gathering statistics and analyzing trends. Crowning these strengths, the WTO must launch a new era of trade and investment negotiations. Other promising approaches may exist, but we think that plurilateral agreements on pressing global issues offer an excellent path forward."

The policy brief discusses many ways of getting out of the impasse - to step back and look at the gains and go on multiple tracks of plurilateral agreements (like the Government Procurement Agreement). The suggestions on State Owned Enterprises reinforce the ideological position of the State's limited role in development as against the role of the market and may need more critical analysis. Overall the steps suggested do offer a starting point for a fresh look at where the negotiators left off at Doha. It is one thing to say that the WTO is live and kicking because of its "crown jewel" - the DSM; it is quite an other thing to achieve fresh progress in negotiations to give a fresh lease of life to the multilateral trading system. After all,  however well the dispute settlement mechanism functions, beyond a point, it cannot exist in a vacuum where the political negotiations are not addressing realities of international trade. That would lead to a situation of judicial overreach that may threaten the system as a whole. The approach suggests a middle path - no single undertaking, work on the progress achieved and aim for plurilateral agreements.

Dani Rodrik, Joel Trachtman and domestic policy space - Yes and a No?

I have often raised the issue in this blog about WTO  and domestic, regulatory policy space. Do the WTO Agreements unreasonably restrict policy space for nations to implement their policies? Are the restrictions to policy space justified? Is there sufficient scope within the contours of the various agreements to pursue one's domestic agenda? Do the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement , Agreement on Agriculture  and SCM Agreement  violate a country's sovereign control over domestic policy making? Critics of the WTO argue that the nation state's influence is withering away due to globalised trade rules and are losing their power and significance. They challenge multilateral trade rules as an infringement of sovereignty and democratic governance.On the other hand, supporters of the globalised, rule based multilateral system argue that these rules are not unreasonable and do not infringe upon country's ability to govern. They only reduce the barriers to trade and restrict unfair "protectionism" which is detrimental to the globalised economy.

Prominent amongst the critiques of unhindered globalisation is Dani Rodrik  who argued that hyperglobalisation, democracy and national autonomy cannot go together. I have blogged about his views earlier here and here. In his book "TheGlobalisation Paradox" the central argument, although not framed as such, operates as a critique of international law. He advocates a strictly limited role for international law relating to globalization, providing “traffic rules” for international trade, but avoiding other constraints on national policy prerogatives. Joel Trachtman  counters this by arguing that WTO as an institution as well as the multilateral legal framework does allow nations to pursue their domestic policy choice to the extent that they are not discriminatory or protectionist. I found several paras in this response  of Joel Trachtman that addresses some of the issues of the trade-off between multilateral rules and domestic policy choice.

"Rodrik suggests that today’s World Trade Organization is heading toward this kind of domination in order to promote hyperglobalization, in which domestic economic management is made subservient to international trade and finance. This seems seriously overblown. The WTO is not a “them,” but an “us”; in the vernacular of Geneva, it is a “member organization.” It is composed of states, and no treaty rules are established unless each state agrees. Each state agrees through its own system of ratification, which incorporates the democratic accountability that that state determines is needed. What is the mechanism by which this will result in an imperial WTO, suppressing the autonomy of its member states?

Existing WTO rules are far more respectful of national autonomy than Rodrik concedes. WTO rules only selectively constrain domestic economic management, only do so in ways that states have agreed, and have only very small impacts on policies that are neither protectionist nor mercantilist (by “mercantilist,” I mean government policies that are designed to promote exports).

          ...

It is entirely natural, efficient, and consistent with national autonomy that states contracted with one another to reduce the scope of policy externalities where the national intervention is not motivated by ordinary domestic goals, but by opportunities to achieve domestic protectionist goals at the expense of foreign persons. This is the “virtual representation” role of international law. The purpose of trade law in this context seems to be to allow states to agree to avoid creating these inefficient policy externalities, not to force all states to dance to the same tune.Furthermore, as suggested above, the entry of states into the WTO was an expression of their democratic politics. Moving forward, states may withdraw from the WTO at any time, so the continuing membership of states in the WTO is, in a sense, a continuing expression of their democratic politics. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, the structure of remedies for violation of WTO law allows states to simply violate their WTO commitments in exchange for suspension of concessions or other obligations in a substantially equivalent amount—the remedy is simply a re-establishment of a reciprocal level of liberalization. Democratic politics is empowered to change its mind, but you cannot keep concessions that you do not pay for with reciprocal concessions.

...

In conclusion, it is necessary to recognize fully that international law can be understood as a servant of national autonomy, and of national welfare maximization. Of course, there are circumstances in which international law is formed in a way that seems coercive or ill-considered, but then it is incumbent upon us to address the underlying coercive structure or the analytical basis for international law initiatives, rather than to suggest that international law should not be used. Its potential as a tool of welfare enhancement is too great for states to abjure its use."

Do the WTO Agreements give adequate policy space to countries to maintain domestic regulatory independence? It is necessary to analyse each of the various multilateral agreements to come to a conclusion either way. While there is no doubt that on certain principles (national treatment and most favoured nation treatment) domestic policy space is restricted, the Agreements do give countries the flexibility to act based on their perceived "national interest" as long as the measure is not "protectionist" or "discriminatory" between imported and domestic goods. 


Can these provisions be considered as some examples of exercise of domestic policy space within multilateral trade rules:

1. General exceptions under Article XX of GATT and other exceptions under various Agreements 
2. Anti-dumping measures
3. Safeguards Agreement
4. Non-actionable subsidies under the SCM Agreement
5. Legitimate objectives under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement

In other words, though unreasonable restrictions to trade and protectionism is prohibited under various provisions of the WTO Agreements,there are various provisions which provide for countries to take measures to protect domestic interests. If one perceives raising tariffs or imposing quantitative restrictions or providing export subsidies as per se a sine qua non of domestic policy space, then the WTO would be viewed as infringing these rights. However, if reduction of barriers to trade and removing unfair conditions of competition are considered apriori necessities, then the Agreements do have an element of providing sufficient policy space to regulate. Further, in many areas of domestic policy space like education , health, public provisioning of infrastructure the WTO has no say and influence. The State can continue to implement policies that suit its local needs and are considered approriate. For example, how much and what kind of public investment in education as well as to what extent the State should provision it is outside the realm of the WTO. However, subsidies (when they relate to exports or favouring local content vis a vis imported goods) come within the purview of the WTO rules. Hence, when we speak about domestic policy space we need to qualify our statement that in certain areas of domestic regulation the ambit of multilateral trade rules do have a bearing. This is not to imply that the WTO has a hegemonic influence on all national, domestic policy imperatives. To imply that would be simplistic. Supporters of the multilateral system as an effective instrument of international law would argue that the State is after all a willing party to it and has come in with consent and has "contracted" out part of its sovereignty.  Critics would nevertheless say that the issue of how much this "consent" is free or driven by 'circumstances" is debatable. 


Nevertheless, the Dispute Settlement mechanism (DSM) is another example wherein a rule based system overpowers power relations. In the DSM a developing country can win a case against an influential developed country which could result in a "domestic" policy choice of a developed country being overturned. Ofcourse there are issues on the efficacy and efficiency of the remedies under the DSM, but it is recognised that it is one of the cornerstones of the WTO. Well, coming back to the question - does the WTO restrict domestic policy independence. The answer is perhaps a yes and a no? We need to tread the middle path once again?

WTO, labour standards and public morals

 
(Courtesy:Two young Bolivian girls give a piglet a bath before dressing him for dinner. / United Nations Photo / Jean Pierre Laffont.)


The issue of linking labour standards to international trade is a contentious one. The proponents of universal international labour standards and enforcement through international trade agreements argue that lower labour standards, including child labour, creates an unfair advantage to the countries using them and results in cheaper goods entering their markets endangering their products as well as labour. They argue that similar labour standards must be implemented across to avoid unfair competition and trade and propose that countries should be allowed to impose trade barriers when labour standards are not followed. The opponents of this view argue that labour standards are the domain of domestic governments and should not be linked to enforceable international trade agreements. While accepting that improvements in standards of labour is a compelling prerogative for countries its linkage to trade is a veiled attempt at protectionism by the developed world to protect their products and labour. They oppose any linkage with international trade and argue that the WTO  is no the right forum to take up this issue. I had blogged about child labour and trade issues in earlier blog posts here  and here .

The Boston Review  carried a piece  on this issue titled "Hype or Help - Globalisation and the fight over labor standards". It argued that the fight for better labour standards by the developed world would actually not benefit it to the extent that is normally believed.

" Now the issue of labor standards has become economically more momentous and politically murkier. The importance of the economic issue has grown in proportion to the exploding income gap between the world’s rich countries in the “North” and poor countries in the “South.” In the nineteenth century the divide in per capita income between England and its emulators was roughly 2:1. Today the comparable distance between the United States and the average developing country is on the order of 25:1. At the same time, technology and foreign investment are flowing more freely than ever from North to South, thereby evening out international differences in output per worker. As a result, employers can now hire high productivity labor in the South, at relatively low wages. And that represents a threat to the living standards of Northern workers.

This threat has mixed up the politics of labor standards. Conservative views about labor standards have remained the same—they propose to let the compensation of labor be fixed by market forces. But a geographical division has developed between the South and “progressive” or “internationalist” labor advocates in the North (mainly the United States). These advocates note the two-decade-long stagnation of real wages in the United States, and argue that important causes of that stagnation are low wages (in relation to productivity) and minimalist labor standards in late-industrializing, Southern countries. To revitalize wages in the North, they propose a more militant posture towards labor standards in late-industrializing countries, and urge that that posture be implemented through trade agreements. Such agreements would make access to Northern markets by companies located in the South contingent on sharp improvements in Southern labor standards.

                    ...

Are these arguments for tougher Southern labor standards compelling, or are they—as critics argue—a thin veil for protectionism? Should progressives in the South accept them, or be placed in the awkward position of resisting higher labor standards? To answer these questions, we need to be clear about the the kinds of labor standards in question. In particular, the issue is not health and safety conditions, and the right of Southern workers to be treated like human beings—not to be murdered for organizing unions, for example. These rights are inviolate, and must continue to be fought for through diplomatic channels, such organizations as the ILO, and popular protest. Rather, the standards in question focus on rates of pay—for example, minimum wage regulations, or requirements that wage increases be linked closely to productivity growth."

Arguing that the new form of globalism does not really benefit the view held by the proponents of universal international standards enforcement through international trade agreements, the article concludes:

"Against the background of this particular form of globalism, the demand for tighter labor standards in the South as a way to protect workers in the North is not only likely to harm the South but is also likely to be weak tea in the North. While demands by Northern progressives and labor activists for international income redistribution may be politically attractive with the home team, they are no substitute for aggressive policies in favor of economic expansion. Unless the growth of the global economy accelerates—as it did in the late 19th century —the problems posed by low-wage Southern competition to Northern workers promise to be enormous" 

It would be interesting to see the debate in the context of existing  WTO Agreements. Article XX (General Exceptions) of the GATT  provides countries to take certain measures under specific circumstances to further certain public policy goals. Article XX (a) is as follows:

"Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:

(a)      necessary to protect public morals;"

Can the universalisation of labour standards be argued from a standpoint of public morals? Let us take an example of a developed country which is impacted by cheaper goods from a developing country where labour standards are less stringent than its own. Can the developed country legislate banning products of countries which do not follow a certain labour standard on the grounds that using such labour standards goes against its "public morals" as it considers a certain degree of labour standards as necessary and moral. Though it would not violate the "national treatment" principle as goods produced within the developed country too must follow similar standards, is it a disguised restriction on international trade? Does it constitute veiled protectionism? Can the "public moral" standard be used to impact processes, in this case labour standards,  outside one's country? 

Technology and Globalisation

I came across a reference to this book on globalisation which is not generally about the issues of globalisation that is discussed in terms of integration, supply chains and domestic policies furthering trade. It is about the technologies that propel globalisation primarily Diesel Engines and Gas Turbines. In the debates around globalisation we often forget the technologies that drive them!

US, rule based WTO and Cloves Cigarettes Case

A considerable amount of debate surrounding the next steps US would take to comply with the AB decision in the Clove Cigarettes case at the WTO has been generated in the IELP Blog. Differing views and stand points do exist. 

I came across this essay by Rachel Brewster from Harvard Law School as to why the US agreed to a rule based WTO rather than a power based one and I try to place its relevance in the ongoing debate of compliance in the Cloves Cigarette case. While arguing that the US' acceptance of a rule based WTO dispute resolution system was prompted by domestic power equations,  (President's bargaining position vis a vis the Legislature) the essay gives instances of US domestic legislation being amended pursuant to WTO DSM decisions which I find relevant to the Clove Cigarettes debate:

"In the time since the passage of the WTO agreement, the United States has changed its domestic law to comply with international rulings. Most notably, the United States altered its tax system regarding export subsidies. The European Union (“EU”) had long claimed that the United States gave its exporters special breaks by exempting from income tax large portions of overseas sales. The United States maintained that it was simply leveling the playing field between exporters because European nations used a territorial tax system that had a similar effect.

...

After the WTO system was in place, the European Union de-cided to bring the case again. In 2000, the appellate body affirmed a panel judgment for the EU, and a panel later authorized the Europeans to impose $4 billion in sanctions.This time the U.S. bargaining position was different because the United States could neither block the panel report nor threaten counter-retaliation. Exporters, who were likely to be hit by the sanctions, viewed the threat of sanctions as credible and responded accordingly. Companies as diverse as Motorola, International Paper, General Electric, and Pepsi started lobbying campaigns in response to the threat.

The Treasury Department put forward a proposal to change the tax code, but Congress was slow to act until the EU began applying sanctions in March 2004. The EU started gradually, applying five percent tariffs on several goods at first and then raising tariffs an additional one percent each month. Legislators acted relatively quickly after the sanctions were applied, passing the new exporter tax bill in October 2004.The EU lifted the sanctions in January 2005, although they continue to contest aspects of the new legislation, which provide temporary tax breaks for certain exporters.

In response to the WTO’s ruling, legislators also have recently repealed the Byrd Amendment, which awarded cash to domestic firms that brought complaints against importers. Congress was reluctant to alter the measure, but the recent threat of sanctions spurred action. The WTO panel authorized several contracting parties, including the EU and Japan, to impose $150 million in sanctions. The EU and Canada started applying sanctions in May 2005, while Japan and Mexico did likewise in August 2005. In February 2006, Congress repealed the measure in a budget reconciliation bill but phased out the Byrd Amendment’s awards to importers over two years.

Even when complaining states have the right to sanction, we should expect that parties will often settle for something less than full compliance with the expected legal ruling. As Professor An-drew Guzman notes, enforcement of the decision can be difficult and costly. Sanctions are a “double-edged sword,” injuring businesses in both the sanctioned and sanctioning states.Thus, governments generally want to reach a settlement rather than impose sanctions for non-compliance with panel decisions. Furthermore, the level of sanctions authorized by the WTO may be insufficient to convince legislators to repeal the offending provision entirely. The WTO system will not keep members of Congress from violating multilateral trade agreements, but it increases the costs of such violations."

In the Clove Cigarettes Case, would the US amend the legislation banning flavoured cigarettes? On the contrary is the threat of sanctions and compensation in this case so insignificant that it would continue to maintain the ban and let Indonesia go ahead with the sanctions? Would the US strive for a settlement or are economic interests not so critically effected to do so? Is there a reputational risk of non-compliance that the US would be worried about? Would it dent its image of a country that abides by international trade rules irrespective of whether it is in its favour? Could it's legitimacy in seeking enforcement against other countries violating trade rules be dented by its own non-compliance?

US dominated disputes!

The Dispute Settlement Body met this week  and considered three matters, all related to the US. The WTO website  reported about the meeting . The International Law Prof Blog  also has referred to this US focus of the DSB meeting. The three matters were:

1. Adoption of the Cloves Cigarettes  Panel and Appellate Body Reports - The measures the US would take in terms of compliance is still awaited. Would it modify its legislation, maintain status quo and argue that changed circumstances signify compliance or allow retaliation?

2. US — Measures Affecting the Cross Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services  - The US argued that it had sought amendments to its GATS commitments and had also offered compensation to Antigua.

3. US — Anti-Dumping Administrative Reviews and Other Measures Related to Imports of Certain Orange Juice from Brazil - The US said that by abandoning the zeroing methodology it had sbstantialy complied with the order.

I am not going into the details of each of these cases. Just wanted to highlight some thoughts on reading the meeting proceedings:

a. While the Cloves case is yet to reach the compliance stage, the other two cases indicate the US' compliance by bringing the its domestic measure in compliance in one case (Orange Juice case) and by seeking to modify its international commitments under GATS n the other (Gambling case).

b. The three disputes again highlight the significance of the DSM wherein countries of differing economic and trading power can seek remedy under the WTO against a powerful, trading partner. In all three cases, the US was at the receiving end of the decision. For some it would highlight the "neutrality" of a rule based system as compared to a power based, negotiation led model. There are still those who argue that compliance and impact of the decisions would be determined by the comparative trading strengths of the countries. Nevertheless, the fact that a country irrespective of its trading, political and economic strength can take the US to a dispute forum is in itself a sign of an egalitarian system.

c. I found Antigua's written submission at the DSB in the Gambling case:

 "It was thus time, according to Antigua and Barbuda, for the US to do what it asks of others — to observe its international obligations in good faith and with due consideration for the rights and legal status of Antigua and Barbuda. Antigua and Barbuda informed the DSB that it had formally notified the US of its desire to seek recourse to the good offices of the DG in finding a mediated solution to this dispute."

Does this statement indicate a "credibility" pressure for countries to comply with Panel/AB decisions? While a country seeks compliance from others, its credibility is at stake when it is on the other side.

On the whole, a US "dominated" DSB week!