I had blogged here about the recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the EU against the U.S. in relation to the issue of compliance in the Boeing dispute here. More submissions dated 12th October by the EU here.
The gist of the legal claim is here:
"28. The European Union considers that, after the end of the implementation period, the United States maintains a series of subsidies, within the meaning of Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement through each of the measures listed in Section I, above. Each of those measures provides a financial contribution within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1), as detailed further in Section I, and confers a "benefit" within the meaning of Article 1.1(b) by providing the financial contribution on terms more favourable than would be available on the commercial market. Those subsidies are specific, within the meaning of Articles 1.2 and 2 of the SCM Agreement, as detailed further in Section I.
29. Those specific subsidies presently benefit the development, production and sale of Boeing’s 737NG, 737 Max, 747, 767, 777 and 787 families of LCA, as well as any other future derivatives of these LCA families, including of the 777. Collectively, and under the conditions of competition present in the LCA markets, the subsidies listed in items I.A to G cause present adverse effects, in the form of serious prejudice, and threat thereof, to EU interests, inconsistently with Articles 5(c), 6.3(a), 6.3(b) and 6.3(c), including Articles 6.4 and 6.5, of the SCM Agreement. The effects of those subsidies adversely impact sales, market shares and prices of Airbus’ A320, A320neo, A330, A350XWB and A380 families of LCA. Specifically, the subsidies cause present serious prejudice, or threat thereof, to EU interests, in the form of: (i) displacement and impedance of EU imports into the United States, within the meaning of Article 6.3(a) of the SCM Agreement; (ii) displacement and impedance of EU exports to other third country markets, within the meaning of Article 6.3(b) of the SCM Agreement (including on the basis of Article 6.4 of the SCM Agreement); and, (iii) significant price undercutting, price suppression, price depression, and lost sales, within the meaning of Article 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement (including on the basis of Article 6.5 of the SCM Agreement).
30. In addition, the subsidies provided through the measures listed in items I.A to G are contingent, in law or in fact, on actual or anticipated export performance, and accordingly, are inconsistent with Articles 3.1(a) (including footnote 4) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement.
31. Moreover, the subsidy measures listed in items I.A to G are contingent, in law or in fact, on the use of domestic over imported goods, such that they are, accordingly, inconsistent with Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement.
32. Through those same measures listed in items I.A to G above, the United States accords treatment less favourable to imported products than that accorded to like products of US origin, in law or in fact, inconsistently with Articles III:4 of the GATT 1994, and maintains internal quantitative regulations that require, directly or indirectly, that specified amounts or proportions of products be supplied from domestic sources, in law or in fact, inconsistent with Article III:5 of the GATT 1994. Moreover, the United States otherwise applies such regulations in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1 of Article III, including the principle that such laws, regulations and requirements and internal quantitative regulations should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production.
Both the disputes (Airbus and Boeing) offer an opportunity for rich juriprudential churning in the area of subsidies under the WTO. It also highlights the complexity of claims, the intertwining of fact and law as well as the extent to which domestic policy is impacted by international law. From local city measures to national subsidy policy, the entire gamut of subsidy measures have been challenged by the EU. This dispute also tests the efficacy of the dispute settlement mechanism. WIll the U.S. comply with the Appellate Body order? What constitutes compliance? If nothing else, the complex quagmire of legalese is an international lawyers goldmine.
No comments:
Post a Comment